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ABSTRACT 
The paper analyses the institutional dynamics surrounding common-pool resources in 
postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe. It is conceived in close conjunction with the 
case studies reported in the four preceding papers in this series. The purpose of this pa-
per is to frame the individual case inquiries, compare the findings from the four plus 
two additional case studies, and relate those to broader agrarian and environmental 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The comparative assessment suggests that resource governance has shifted from the 
previously dominant legal and administrative state hierarchies towards markets. In addi-
tion, state power has moved from central governments towards local authorities. The 
waning and decentralisation of state power has caused the emergence of significant gaps 
between property legislation and rights-in-practice, which have been particularly stark 
in weak states. The discrepancy between legal texts and rights-in-practice leads to the 
exclusion of public and collective interests in favour of private interests in CPR man-
agement. It finds its environmental expression in the declining use of water control sys-
tems, widespread destruction of water infrastructure, and unfettered conversion of agri-
cultural land for urban sprawl. Thus, the findings attest to the central role of distributive 
issues in postsocialist privatisation and suggest an additional dimension of distributive 
conflict: different rights and obligations associated with resources. They also suggest 
the need for postsocialist governments to be actively involved in the management of 
common-pool resources for the protection of public and collective interests. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural policy has undergone radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe over 
the past decade and a half (Swinnen 1997, Swinnen et al. 1997). Privatisation programs 
have shifted control over production from state and collective units to private entities. 
Decollectivization policy has discriminated against the previously dominant large-scale 
production units in favour of small-scale farming. Decentralisation has sought to relo-
cate government power from central to local authorities. Marketization, finally, has sub-
stituted market mechanisms for allocation by administrative decisions. Thus, agricul-
tural policy has sought to change the institutional framework regulating agricultural 
production. Dramatic changes in outputs, inputs, and cropping structures attest to the 
impacts of policy reforms on agricultural production across the region (Lerman 2000, 
Tangermann and Banse 2000). 
 
This paper explores the environmental effects of agrarian transformations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, with a particular focus on the institutional dynamics surrounding the 
use of common-pool resources. The paper is conceived to provide a comparative as-
sessment of agrarian and environmental change in the region, to be read in close con-
junction with the case studies reported in the four preceding papers of this discussion 
paper series (Penov 2002, Ratinger and Krumalova 2002, Schleyer 2002, Wasilewski 
and Krukowski 2002). The case studies examine the management of water and land-
scape in four specific contexts of postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe. The purpose 
of this paper is to frame the individual inquiries, compare the findings from the four 
plus two additional case studies, and relate the findings to broader agrarian and envi-
ronmental changes in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
The paper concludes that agrarian transformations have brought a reconfiguration of 
'rights-in-practice' on common-pool resources. Powerful rural actors have extended their 
control over common-pool resources beyond the level foreseen in property reforms. 
They have also refused to assume responsibility for duties associated with resource 
rights. Property on common-pool resources thus resembles the 'recombinant' property 
observed in Hungarian industry, i.e., property shaped by enterprise managers' attempts 
to privatise assets and reject responsibility for associated debts (Stark 1996). Underlying 
this reconfiguration of property relations are broader changes in governance. State 
power has weakened significantly as markets and non-state actors have expanded their 
influence. In addition, state power has shifted from central to local levels, beyond the 
degrees desired in decentralisation policy. Thus, common-pool resources in weak states 
of postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe have been subject to an enclosure-type 
movement, as powerful private actors seized control over valuable resources to the det-
riment of collective and public interests. 
 
The first part of this paper introduces the theoretical underpinnings and environmental 
concerns motivating the research. It begins presenting the joint theoretical framework 
on property and governance guiding the case studies and subsequently reviews broader 
agrarian and environmental changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The comparative 
assessment of the six case studies is the core of the second part of the paper. After a 
brief overview of the case studies, analysis focuses on changes in property legislation, 
resource governance, and property rights-in-practice to understand the institutional fac-
tors underlying observed environmental changes. The paper concludes with a summary 
of major findings and policy implications for sustainable management of common-pool 
resources in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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2 PROPERTY AND GOVERNANCE 
Rising awareness of natural resource degradation and environmental change has caused 
significant interest in the social dynamics underlying resource use over the past three 
decades. Researchers of various disciplinary backgrounds have documented and ana-
lysed institutions regulating resource management (cf. McCay and Acheson 1987, 
Wade 1988, Ostrom 1990, Agrawal 2001). Common-pool resources have received spe-
cial attention, as their nature poses particular challenges to management: it is difficult or 
costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from the benefits originating from the resource 
(Ostrom 1990, Bromley 1992). As a result, the interests of resource users do typically 
not overlap with collective and public interests in the resource, a situation typical for 
many resource use problems. 
  
Regularities in the findings of numerous case studies and behavioural experiments sug-
gest systematic linkages between the characteristics of involved resource transactions 
and actors, on the one hand, and resource institutions, on the other (Wade 1988, Ostrom 
1990, Ostrom et al. 1994, Baland and Platteau 1996, Agrawal 2001). Hagedorn et al. 
(2002) conceptualise the linkages between actors, transactions, and institutions as de-
picted in Figure 1. 
• Features of transactions related to nature: Biophysical properties of natural re-
sources and available technologies condition natural resource transactions in ways 
that put them apart from every-day transactions. As for common-pool resources, 
they differ from other transactions by the non-excludability of potential beneficiaries 
from resource benefits. 
• Characteristics of actors: Actors involved in transactions have different capacities 
and interests to claim rights on natural resources. Also, they differ by their degree of 
political organisation and position in power relations. 
• Property rights on nature components: Property rights determine the distribution of 
benefit and cost streams originating from a natural resource. Property relations are 
best understood as bundles of rights and duties, as different entities may enjoy dif-
ferent rights and obligations on different components of a resource.  
Figure 1: Determinants of Institutional Change on Nature Components
Interaction between actors
and nature components
1. Features of transactions
related to nature
2. Characteristics of actors
Institutions of sustainability
3. Property rights on nature
components
4. Governance structures on
natural resources
Source: Hagedorn et al. 2002
Thomas Sikor - The Commons in Transition 
8 Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No. 10 
• Governance structures on natural resources: Governance structures determine how 
transactions happen. Transactions may take place on markets, in hierarchies, 
through horizontal non-market forms of co-ordination, and in hybrid forms. Gov-
ernance also structures related aspects of resource transactions, primarily knowledge 
dissemination, monitoring, conflict resolution, enforcement, and innovation. 
 
Observed regularities in management have motivated recommendations for sustainable 
resource management. Among others, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues attribute high 
potential to common property regimes and local self-organisation for the management 
of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994, Ostrom 1999). They call 
for the devolution of resource management to local collectives. They cite numerous 
cases of sustainable common-pool resource management by local communities as evi-
dence. Yet most of these cases stem from remote villages in developing countries. It has 
remained an open question how relevant the findings and recommendations are for 
common-pool resources in other contexts, such as local common-pool resources in in-
dustrialised countries or those at national and international levels. This paper wants to 
help answer the question by examining the institutional dynamics surrounding common-
pool resources in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
3 AGRARIAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Rural areas in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe have experience of radical 
changes in agrarian institutions. Privatisation policy has been a key force driving agrar-
ian transformations (Swinnen 1997, Szelenyi 1998, Turnock 1998). By way of restitu-
tion or distribution, Central and Eastern European governments have transferred owner-
ship of land, natural resources, and other assets from state and collective entities to pri-
vate actors. By the end of the 1990s, ownership patterns and farm structures demon-
strated drastic changes (Swinnen et al. 1997, Lerman 2000, Tangermann and Banse 
2000, Lenormand 2001). The shares of agricultural land under state and collective own-
ership had decreased across CEE countries, increasing the land held in private owner-
ship. Yet despite its rapid pace, privatisation has been far from harmonic. Distributive 
conflicts have shaped the redefinition of property relations, at the level of policy choice 
and local implementation (Rabinowicz and Swinnen 1997, Swinnen and Mathijs 1997, 
Szelenyi 1998). Historical land owners, agricultural managers, new private entrepre-
neurs, reform-minded politicians, and other groups have negotiated property reforms at 
national and local levels. 
 
Postsocialist states have undergone equally radical transformations. They have not only 
withdrawn from active roles in production and exchange, but decentralisation programs 
have shifted state power from central to local levels (Nunberg 1999). Decentralisation 
programs have empowered local governments to expand their role in decision-making, 
giving them authority over fields that had previously been under central authority. They 
have endowed local governments with new fiscal authorities in the generation and allo-
cation of funds. The programs have also strengthened the democratic legitimisation and 
control of local governments by introducing direct election of local representatives. 
 
As privatisation and decentralisation programs transformed agrarian relations, rural 
property relations have been highly diverse. First, contemporary agrarian structures in-
clude farming land owners, land owners with additional leased land, partnerships char-
acterised by joint ownership and operation, various types of co-operatives and private 
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companies working land leased from hundreds of land owners, and state farms (Swin-
nen and Mathijs 1997, Mathijs and Swinnen 1998, Lerman 2000). Agrarian structures 
display large differences between countries, as influenced by pre-reform farm struc-
tures, land reforms, privatisation policy, and broader agricultural policy. Second, local 
property relations differ by the degree to which they overlap with national legislation. 
Or, in other words, rural actors have demonstrated varying powers to translate legal 
rights into rights-in-practice (Verdery 1999). They have been able to exercise their legal 
rights only where local state authorities or social structures are sufficiently strong to 
back their rights. For example, Romanian villagers hold claims to shares of the village 
land, without the possibility to actually withdraw the land from joint operations (ibid.).  
 
A third complicating factor is variance in the connection between legal rights and eco-
nomic benefits (Giordano and Kostova 1996, Swinnen and Mathijs 1997, Verdery 
1999). The linkage between rights and benefits depends on the nature of markets for 
land, machinery services, output, and credit. In many regions, monopolistic market 
structures have reduced the returns to land for farming land owners, while offering size-
able profits for more powerful actors. Finally, property rights and associated duties have 
become increasingly differentiated, with different entities holding rights and facing du-
ties to the same object. For example, agricultural land in Albania, Czech Republic, and 
Slovenia has been found subject to claims by multiple actors, including title holders, 
historical owners, and lineages (de Waal 1996, Turnock 1998, Lemel 2000). Thus, the 
diversity of postsocialist property relations goes far beyond the differences in agrarian 
structures. It includes perplexing combinations of specific rights-in-practice and duties-
in-practice, which translate into different claims on economic benefits and responsibili-
ties for economic costs. 
 
Agrarian transformations have been paralleled by profound environmental changes. 
Environmental changes associated with agriculture have not been uniform. Rural envi-
ronmental problems have aggravated in some regions but relieved in others. The follow-
ing four appear to be the main rural environmental problems in post-socialist Central 
and Eastern Europe, as suggested by a review of large-scale environmental assessments 
(CEESA 1999, OECD 1999, CEESA 2000, World Bank 2000): 
• Loss of traditional landscapes and biodiversity: landscapes and biological 
species are threatened by the intensification of cultivation in some regions 
and land abandonment in others (Turnock 1998, Brouwer et al. 2001). 
• Deterioration of irrigation and drainage infrastructure: water control systems 
have not been maintained, particularly in South-eastern European countries 
(Muica and Zavoianu 1996, Turnock 1998, Lemel 2000). 
• Water pollution: increasing application of external inputs and inappropriate 
storage of slurry contribute to water quality problems. 
• Soil degradation: agricultural intensification and abandonment of soil protec-
tion measures lead to depletion of nutrients, erosion, and acidification. 
 
Thus, rural areas in Central and Eastern Europe have experience of radical changes in 
agrarian institutions and environmental conditions. The linkages between institutional 
and environmental changes are poorly understood, however. We therefore set out to 
explore the institutional dynamics underlying observed environmental changes through 
a set of case studies, which we introduce briefly in the following. 
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4 THE CASE STUDIES IN OVERVIEW 
We chose landscape and water management problems to examine the institutional dy-
namics surrounding common-pool resources in postsocialist transformations. The stud-
ies in the Czech Republic and Poland examine issues around the preservation of land-
scapes, to represent common-pool resources at the (inter)national level (see the text box 
and Figure 2). The studies in Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Latvia and Romania investi-
gate the management of water, presumably a primarily local common-pool resource.1 
The six case studies are located in a diversity of rural contexts in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Those range from Eastern Germany, which experienced rapid institutional re-
forms and integration into the European Union, to Bulgaria, Latvia, and Romania, in 
which agrarian reforms have met severe impediments. In-between these two more ex-
treme situations are the Czech Republic and Poland, which have implemented reforms 
rapidly and are expected to join the EU soon. The focus on two types of common-pool 
resource situated in a range of postsocialist contexts was intended to facilitate analysis 
of the institutional dynamics characterising contemporary agrarian transformations in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Land ownership is fragmented in all case study regions, as a consequence of land resti-
tution to historical owners and the dominance of small holdings in pre-collectivisation 
land ownership. The Polish case study is a slight exception, as some land remained un-
der private ownership throughout socialist agriculture. The major rural actors therefore 
include small holders, subsidiary farmers, non-farming land owners, large-scale com-
                                                 
1 We have by now learned that the designation of water management as a local problem is sometimes 
problematic. The centralised organisation of water control and construction of large-scale infrastructure 
under socialist agriculture make it hard to confine potential beneficiaries to a small local area. In addi-
tion, water control assumes national importance in some countries such as Latvia, where drainage has 
transformed cultural landscapes on a large share of total land. 
Text box: The environmental issues examined in the case studies 
 
Bulgaria: The amount of water used for irrigation in the Plovdiv region has declined sharply since
1990. In addition, irrigation canals were not maintained, leading farmers to increasingly draw
on underground water sources (Penov 2001, 2002). 
Czech Republic: Bílé Karpaty has been declared a nature conservation area for its valuable cultural
landscapes and species diversity. The restrictions imposed on farming practices have reduced
the profitability of farming, leading to land abandonment (Ratinger and Krumalova 2001,
2002). 
Eastern Germany: Investments in water control infrastructure transformed the low-moor region
Schraden. The neglect of infrastructure maintenance over the past decade and a half has led to
water logging in the spring and draught periods in the summer (Schleyer 2001, 2002). 
Latvia: Drainage transformed Latvian agriculture and landscapes in the 20th century. However,
many farmers stopped maintaining drainage canals after 1990. Deteriorating drainage systems
have negative impacts on soil moisture conditions and cultural landscapes (Busmanis et al.
2001). 
Poland: Agricultural land has rapidly shrunk in the surroundings of the urban centres Warsaw and
Olsztyn. An increasing share of the land has been converted to housing land, reducing tradi-
tional agricultural landscapes and open space (Wasilewski and Krukowski 2001, 2002). 
Romania: Irrigation management has fallen into disarray in Manastirea commune in the southern
part of the country. Neither the state nor local people have maintained the irrigation system.
The decline of irrigation has reduced the efficiency of water use and led to soil salinisation
(Leonte 2002). 
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mercial farmers, and co-operatives, the latter being typically operated by previous so-
cialist managers. Local offices of central ministries and local authorities represent cen-
tral and local governments, in the Bulgarian and Czech cases supplemented by special-
ised agencies subject to central control. These are the main rural actors, rounded out by 
a non-governmental organisation in the Czech case and a university extension project in 
East Germany.  
The current situation is radically different from that under socialist agriculture. Large 
state farms and co-operatives dominated agricultural production in the case study sites, 
with the exception of the Polish sites. Large state bureaucracies were the tools for a 
strongly hierarchical approach to natural resource management, combined with some 
elements of local-level co-operation in water management. Technical agencies were 
responsible for the provision of water, construction and maintenance of irrigation and 
drainage infrastructure, soil conservation programs, urban and regional planning, and 
the protection of biodiversity. Postsocialist reforms radically altered the institutional 
framework for the management of common-pool resources as well as rural actor con-
stellations. How agrarian transformations affected the management and state of com-
mon-pool resources is the topic of the ensuing analysis. 
Figure 2: The case studies in Central and Eastern Europe
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5 INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS DRIVING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
This section summarises the comparative assessment of the six case studies. It begins 
with a review of new property legislation introduced by postsocialist governments, fol-
lowed by an analysis of changes in governance structures. The section proceeds to dis-
cuss the differentiation of governance systems and property rights-in-practice within 
Central and Eastern Europe. It concludes examining the environmental implications of 
changes in governance and property. 
 
5.1 REFORMS OF PROPERTY LEGISLATION 
Legal property reforms initiated by Central and Eastern European governments have 
moved control over land and productive resources towards private actors, yet they have 
also maintained public rights to common-pool resources. The reforms have privatised 
excludable goods, such as agricultural implements, machinery, and houses. At the same 
time, most states have retained public property on key natural resources. The Bulgarian 
and Romanian governments keep irrigation infrastructure and water under public own-
ership. Reforms in Eastern Germany and Latvia have privatised small canals but have 
not modified public ownership of larger structures. Similarly, valuable biodiversity 
habitats and landscapes have been put under direct state management across the region. 
 
Legal reforms have connected land rights with duties to maintain land attributes of a 
common-pool resource nature. Agricultural legislation subjects landowners to compre-
hensive duties for the benefit of wider interests in the land. The Czech government im-
poses restrictions on land use and farming practices in protected landscape areas to pre-
serve biodiversity and landscapes. Latvian landowners have to cultivate their land and 
implement soil conservation practices in order to retain legal claims on the land. The 
Polish government has instituted strict regulations on the conversion of agricultural and 
forestry land to other purposes in order to preserve green space. The Bulgarian govern-
ment allows landowners to dig wells, but limits the amounts of water that can be ex-
tracted legally. 
 
Thus, property reforms in Central and Eastern Europe foresee a two-fold role for the 
public sector in property on common-pool resources. First, property laws subject some 
resources to state ownership. Water is the prime example for a natural resource which 
has remained under state ownership. Second, agricultural legislation connects rights to 
land with duties serving the protection of larger benefits originating from the land. Le-
gal land rights are therefore circumscribed quite narrowly in many countries. There are 
differences between countries, though. The Czech government has imposed more severe 
restrictions on private land rights than the government in Poland, where many small 
agricultural land owners had maintained their land rights even during socialist agricul-
ture. Yet these differences are more in the degree than the nature of public rights to 
common-pool resources. 
 
5.2 THE WEAKENING OF THE POSTSOCIALIST STATE AND EXTRA-LEGAL PRIVATISATION 
As governance has moved from the previously dominating state hierarchies towards 
markets and civil society, Central and Eastern European governments have lost some of 
their capacities to enforce property legislation as conceived in legal texts. Rural transac-
tions increasingly respond to expanding markets and other non-state influences, even if 
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that means that they contradict state law. For example, the power of the Bulgarian state 
to monitor and enforce legal regulations governing the use of irrigation water and main-
tenance of infrastructure has declined markedly, as markets and rural power relations 
have exerted stronger influence on farmers. The Czech Ministry of Environment has 
been unable to impose legally prescribed restrictions on land use and farming practices, 
because market forces rendered farming within the legal limits unprofitable. Rural peo-
ple therefore have increasingly contested legal property rights. Those with sufficient 
power have expanded their appropriation of resource benefits and control over resource 
assets beyond the degree defined in national legislation. They have also ignored associ-
ated responsibilities and duties. 
 
This reconfiguration of legal property rights-in-practice finds expression in two related 
processes. First, people ignore the legal duties connected with their land rights. Latvian 
landowners abandon cultivation, despite the legal duty to keep the land under cultiva-
tion. East German landowners do not maintain the small canals traversing their plots 
though their newly obtained land titles require them to do so. Polish landowners divide 
agricultural plots and sell them to urban people for house construction, though national 
directives put tight restrictions on the conversion of agricultural land for other purposes. 
Bulgarian landowners dig new wells and extract water freely, ignoring legal duties to 
register the well and limit the amount of water extracted. 
 
Property rights have become the site of political negotiations between governments and 
landowners, as illustrated by the debates between landowners and the administration of 
the Protected Landscape Area Bile Karpaty. Landowners claim that they hold extensive 
rights to the land and its attributes. They justify their claims with a vision of land resti-
tution that does not only return land to its original owners but also guarantees them the 
same rights as they enjoyed historically. They therefore argue that owners should be 
compensated if the state imposed restrictions on land use. The central government and 
local administration of the Protected Landscape Area profess to a different notion of 
property rights. Their notion presumes that land owners are subject to certain duties in 
land management for public interests. Land use needs to meet certain environmental 
criteria, without further compensations. The notion is reflected in recent regulations for 
the protection of landscape diversity that assume the government's right to outlaw cer-
tain land uses perceived as detrimental to the public interest in nature conservation. 
 
Second, powerful rural actors privatise resources and assets that are under formal state 
ownership through direct appropriation. In areas with weak state power, local actors 
defy state property claims in an outright manner. This may happen in clandestine ways, 
such Bulgarian landowners extracting underground water without legal permissions. 
They may also breach small irrigation canals or deviate water from small rivers to water 
their fields, in the hope that those actions are not discovered or prosecuted. This illegal 
privatisation of resource flows and assets may also happen in the open, however. The 
looting of irrigation equipment is a wide-spread phenomenon in rural Bulgaria. The 
thieves drive to irrigation plants and disassemble the equipment in open daylight. 
 
5.3 DECENTRALISATION OF STATE POWER AND LOCALISATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY  
Not only has state power declined in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe, but it has 
also shifted from central to local authorities. Part of this broad shift has originated from 
the decentralisation policies enacted across the region. Yet the shift has gone beyond the 
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legally mandated degree of decentralisation in many regions. Central authorities have 
faced increasing problems to enforce national legislation, as local actor constellations 
have gained influence in the process of agrarian change. The balance of powers between 
central and local levels has depended on the nature of local power relations, the decen-
tralisation programs enacted at the national level, and historical central-local relations. 
 
In concrete, the decentralisation of state power affects property rights on common-pool 
resources in at least four ways. First, local authorities collude in extra-legal privatisation 
of resource flows and assets. For example, some Bulgarian municipalities have seized 
local irrigation equipment to protect it against looting and secure local control of the 
important productive assets. Agricultural producer co-operatives in other municipalities 
have taken over local irrigation infrastructure, creating rights-in-practice to the infra-
structure. They claim rights though Bulgarian legislation does not allow the transfer of 
ownership rights on irrigation infrastructure to agricultural producer co-operatives. 
 
Second, local government units increasingly act like private owners. Facing tight finan-
cial constraints, state agencies in charge of managing common-pool resources empha-
sise financial criteria more than political mandates. For example, state-owned water 
companies in Bulgaria have only weak incentives to provide water to small producers, 
even though their legal mandate requires them to provide water to every user. Because 
the central government mandates uniform water prices, the water companies have little 
interest to guarantee the costly water supplies to small farmers. 
 
Third, local authorities refuse to enforce duties imposed on resource users for the bene-
fit of non-local interests. They perceive their mandate as the protection of local inter-
ests, ignoring responsibilities handed down from higher levels of government. County 
governments in Poland ally with farmers and the broader rural society to make agricul-
tural land available for urban housing demand. This local alliance drives urbanisation 
around the major urban conglomerates, circumventing national directives on land use 
zoning and land conversion. Mayors of rural municipalities in Bulgaria refuse to enforce 
irrigation regulations and get involved in the resolution of conflicts between the state-
owned irrigation company and individual farmers. Furthermore, many municipalities 
reject the legal duty to maintain local irrigation infrastructure. Decision-making in rural 
counties of Eastern Germany tends to discriminate against the maintenance of water 
control systems, despite the negative effects their decisions cause on downstream coun-
ties. 
 
Finally, local civic organisations and private initiative replace governments as the major 
force driving collective action for common-pool resource management. Some rural vil-
lages in Bulgaria have organised small-scale water user associations. A Czech non-
governmental organisation has established a centre that disseminates information on 
environmentally-sensitive farming practices and support programs, provides labour ser-
vices, and organises the joint marketing of ecological products. Inhabitants in Polish 
suburbs form small civic organisations to buy up agricultural land as a strategy to pre-
serve open space in their environment. Larger farmers in Bulgaria rent small reservoirs, 
using them as water sources and fish ponds, but also supplying water to surrounding 
farmers. 
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5.4 DIFFERENTIATION OF GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS-IN-PRACTICE 
The two trends, the waning of postsocialist state power and decentralisation, affect Cen-
tral and Eastern European regions in different ways. As a consequence, local govern-
ance systems display significant variation. Governance has remained concentrated 
within centralised governments in some areas. Its centre of gravity has shifted to local 
governments in others. Central and Eastern European governments have lost their pre-
vious primacy in governance systems in some areas, giving way to national or local 
actors outside government. For purpose of the ensuing analysis, one can therefore dif-
ferentiate between strong centralised states, strong decentralised states, weak centralised 
states, and weak decentralised states (see Table). 
 
 
Table: Local governance systems in comparison 
 
  significance of state power: 
  high low 
level of  high strong centralised state weak centralised state 
centralisation: low strong decentralised state weak decentralised state 
 
 
It is important to keep in mind that this rough classification of governance systems re-
fers to local political relations in Central and Eastern Europe. The focus on local gov-
ernance implies the possibility that some areas in a country may best be characterised as 
strong centralised states, while others in the same country are better characterised as 
weak centralised states (because of differences in the relations between local and na-
tional actors). Also, this classification ignores the influence of international actors, 
which may strengthen local or central, state or non-state actors at any place. In general, 
international actors tend to strengthen central governments against other actors. For ex-
ample, preparation for EU accession motivates relatively large government programs 
for the protection of biodiversity in the Czech Republic. The programs anticipate the 
agri-environmental measures funded by the agricultural budget of the EU. Financial and 
technical support by the World Bank facilitates the formation of water user associations 
in the Bulgarian countryside. Academics facilitate round-tables with the various actors 
involved in East German water control systems and supplying relevant information 
about options for their improved management. 
 
An application of the classification scheme to the case studies suggests the following 
characterisation of local governance systems. The Czech and East German case studies 
depict strong centralised states, as central government agencies retain a significant level 
of authority over resource management. In contrast, the Polish case study serves as an 
example of a strong decentralised state, as county governments have more leverage on 
land conversion than central government agencies. The Bulgarian, Latvian, and Roma-
nian case studies depict weak decentralised states, as the centre of gravity in governance 
is outside the state and largely dominated by markets. The penetrating influence of mar-
kets is balanced by local organisation only where suitable local actor constellations ex-
ist. 
 
Comparison of the Czech and Polish approaches to landscape protection illustrates the 
difference between strong centralised and decentralised states. The Czech government 
has taken a hierarchical approach to landscape protection in Bílé Karpaty. It has demar-
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cated a Protected Landscape Area by legislative act and has established an administra-
tion that is responsible to the Ministry of Environment. Local interests in the land are 
largely excluded for the sake of the national interest in landscape protection. In contrast, 
the Polish government has not established specialised administrations for protected ar-
eas in the Lubelskie and Warminsko-Mazurskie provinces. The central government has 
demarcated protected areas, just as the Czech government, but it has put local govern-
ments in charge of them. The central government instead seeks to influence local gov-
ernments through subsidy programs to finance environmental protection. The resulting 
Polish governance system allocates much more power to local governments than the 
Czech system. 
 
Differences in governance systems are juxtaposed by variation in the gap between prop-
erty legislation and rights-in-practice. Though happening in every context, extra-legal 
privatisation is a much more wide-spread phenomenon in weak states, as illustrated by 
the examples given above. Private actors directly appropriate state-owned resources and 
ignore state-imposed obligations much more in the Bulgarian and Latvian case studies 
than in the Czech and Polish ones. Property rights in weak states resemble the 'recombi-
nant' property relations in Hungarian industry described by Stark (1996). Private actors 
in weak states successfully negotiate control over public assets while rejecting responsi-
bility for associated liabilities. However, attempts to 'recombine' property rights happen 
in strong states as well. Czech land restituants seek to claim land rights in their histori-
cal extent, rejecting land use regulations motivated by environmental goals. East Ger-
man farmers do their best to ignore duties to maintain water canals, calling upon local 
governments to do the job. Yet strong governments are better equipped to keep these 
attempts under control. 
 
5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 
The findings of the comparative institutional analysis suggest that the observed envi-
ronmental decline in Central and Eastern Europe is closely associated with the recon-
figuration of property rights. Institutional changes caused by larger agrarian transforma-
tions contribute to the deterioration of common-pool resources. Irrigation water usage 
declined precipitously in Bulgaria, leading to competition between up- and downstream 
users and increased reliance on underground water sources. Improper use of irrigation 
systems in Romania has caused water logging and soil salinisation. The neglect of water 
control systems in Eastern Germany has led to draught periods in summers and water 
logging in springs. Soil conservation practices have diminished in Latvia, producing a 
rise in soil acidity and changes in local flora. Urbanisation in Poland consumed a grow-
ing area of agricultural land, making traditional rural landscapes disappear. Only the 
Czech case study reports a reversal in the trend of environmental degradation. After a 
few years of widespread land abandonment, strong involvement by the central govern-
ment motivated landowner to take up farming again.  
 
The blooming orchids of Bile Karpaty illustrate that only strong centralised states have 
been in the position to protect public interests in national common-pool resources. Yet 
the orchids also serve as a reminder that concentration of power in the hands of central-
ised government agencies neglects local interests in common-pool resources. The exclu-
sion of local interests may pose a threat to the integration of interests required for sus-
tainable management in the future. In contrast, the Polish case study depicts a balance of 
interests that is quite opposite to the Czech case. The local alliance of interests in ur-
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banisation prevents the protection of rural landscapes for the interest of the larger Polish 
society. The lack of attention to national interests may motivate efforts by the central 
government in the future to push national interests in landscape protection. In compari-
son, the East German case demonstrates the problems of strong centralised states in 
managing local common-pool resources. Water management in the Schraden region has 
collapsed, also because centralised government agencies could not react to the specific-
ity of the local problem. Thus, common-pool resource management in strong states 
seems to depend on the match between the level of centralisation and the level of the 
common-pool resource. Centralised states protect national but not local common-pool 
resources, while decentralised states protect local but not national common-pool re-
sources. 
 
As for weak states, the fate of local common-pool resources has depended on local actor 
constellations. In many places, powerful private interests have prevented the realisation 
of collective interests, leading to widespread degradation of local common-pool re-
sources, as shown in the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Latvian studies. Yet local actor con-
stellations have also supported individual or collective action for the management of 
local common-pool resources in some contexts. For example, farmers in some Bulgar-
ian villages have organised individual or collective management of irrigation infrastruc-
ture at a small scale. External assistance has helped the establishment of some water 
user associations in Romania and Bulgaria. However, one may doubt that local collec-
tive action can support public interests in national common-pool resources. The im-
provements in resource management that we have studied have been limited to local 
common-pool resources.  
 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Postsocialist agrarian transformations have exerted strong influence on rural environ-
ments in Central and Eastern Europe. Agrarian change has brought about a radical re-
configuration of rural property relations, driven less by legislative reform than by local 
negotiation of legislative changes. Variously positioned rural actors have contested con-
trol over land, natural resources, and other assets, quite independently of property legis-
lation. The outcomes of local negotiations resemble the 'recombinant' property de-
scribed by Stark (1996), as powerful actors seek control over assets but reject responsi-
bility for associated obligations. 'Recombinant' property, in turn, finds expression in 
widespread neglect of public and collective interests in common-pool resources and 
associated environmental deterioration. 
 
The political dynamics surrounding common-pool resources attest to the distributive 
conflicts that have characterised privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast 
to the main privatisation laws, the distributive issues examined in this paper have re-
ceived relatively little attention at the national level. Yet they have been the objects of 
vigorous contestations at the local level. Thus, attention to the specific rights and duties 
connected with resources adds an additional dimension to the distributive politics and 
complexity of postsocialist property relations. Rural actors in postsocialist Europe do 
not only face the challenges of translating legal texts into rights-in-practice, connecting 
legal rights with tangible economic benefits, and disentangling overlapping rights, but 
they also negotiate the specific rights and duties associated with various attributes of 
land and other resources. 
 
Thomas Sikor - The Commons in Transition 
18 Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper No. 10 
Underlying the gap between property legislation and property rights-in-practice have 
been two broads trends in postsocialist governance. Expanding markets and weakening 
state capacity have shifted governance from the previously dominant legal and adminis-
trative state hierarchies to markets and civic forms of co-operation. Decentralisation has 
moved state power away from central towards local authorities. Yet the weakening and 
decentralisation of state power has not affected rural Central and Eastern Europe uni-
formly. Rural governance displays a market differentiation between strong and weak 
states as well as between centralised and decentralised states. The discrepancy between 
property legislation and property rights-in-practice has been most pronounced in locali-
ties with weak states. The variance in rural governance has therefore differentiated envi-
ronmental changes in the region. 
 
Our findings suggest a role for government in the management of common-pool re-
sources in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe. Governments may not get involved 
directly in the co-ordination of common-pool resource management activities, but they 
can strengthen public and collective interests in common-pool resources through meas-
ures that support market allocation and co-operative management (cf. Grafton 2000). 
Markets, which have come to dominate rural governance, require definition, monitoring, 
and enforcement of environmental duties by governments, if markets are to meet public 
interests in common-pool resources. Co-operative management of national common-
pool resources would benefit from government assistance in the dissemination of expert 
knowledge, monitoring, and enforcement. Even local common-pool resource manage-
ment would need government support, particularly in enforcement and dissemination of 
expert knowledge. Rural areas in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe are subject to 
strong external influences and characterised by significant power differences, requiring 
government involvement to create the conditions for local collective action. 
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